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fession is not ready for so radical a reform) by the Uniform Rules of Evidence
lately approved by the American Law Institute and the American Bar Asso-
ciation.
The excellence of Mr. Morgan's treatment of the problems of evidence does
not lie altogether in the proposals he makes for reform. Even if one should
disagree with every one of such proposals, he would find the book valuable
for the keen and well thought out analyses to be found at every turn. Ex-
amples which appealed to me particularly would include his examination
of the precise nature of the proposition that is the subject of judicial notice;
of Thayer's familiar proposition that the risk of persuasion never shifts; of
the problem of communication between witness and the trier of fact; and of
the adversary theory of litigation, its justification and its relationship to the
protection of the hearsay rule.
FLEMING JAMES, JR.t
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, Volume 7, 2d ed. By James William Moore.
Albany: Matthew Bender & Co., 1955. Pp. xxiv, 912 (unused pages re-
served). $18.50.
THE publication of Volume 7 of the second edition of Professor Moore's
Federal Practice brings to a conclusion his revised treatment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The profession now awaits only Volume 1, to deal
with federal jurisdictional matters, for completion of this monumental work.
The review of a second edition, especially an advanced volume of a second
edition, is essentially supererogatory-particularly when the volume is Pro-
fessor Moore's. His profound scholarship, his comprehensive and exhaustive
coverage, his fine analysis, his courageous willingness to be definite and specific,
his sense of prophesy as well as of history, and above all his eagerness to plunge
into difficult waters and swim in strong currents, are too well known to bench
and bar to require repetition. Justice Holmes thought the word "valour" a
little strained as used in the title of Pollock's lecture "Judicial Caution and
Valour,"' but the word is an accurate one to characterize Professor Moore's
work in federal practice.
This volume covers rules 60(b) through 86, thereby including some of the
intrinsically, universally and perenially most difficult problems of judicial ad-
ministration: reconciliation of the law's often opposing goals of finality and
more complete justice (rule 60 (b)) ; the procedural law of the entire injunctive
process (rule 65) ; condemnation (rule 71 (a)) ; the whole gamut of appellate
practice (rules 72-76) ; besides such peculiar offspring of a complicated fed-
eralism as the enigma of a quasi-in rem action precluded as a matter of original
federal jurisdiction but allowed when the case has been removed to federal
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court (rule 64) and the conflicts between state and federal courts in receiver-
ship matters (rule 66). The perhaps drier but no less significant rules on harm-
less error, stays, disability of the judge, execution and the others all get the
author's usual careful treatment.
Most of the thoughtful members of the teaching profession no longer depre-
ciate procedural law; they are now well aware of the profundity of Chief jus-
tice Taft's observation:
"I am especially interested in the matter of procedure, because proce-
dure stands between the abuse of the principles of law and their use for
the benefit of mankind. You can have as high and as sound principles of
law as possible, but if you have not the procedure by which you can apply
them to the ordinary affairs of men, then it does not make any difference
what the principles are or how erroneous they may be."'2
Nevertheless, it takes a treatise like Professor Moore's to teach us that pro-
cedural law is not only of vital importance, but also often fascinating and pro-
found-it can, in fact, be the most truly jurisprudential subject in the curricu-
lum. (I don't except even "jurisprudence" itself!) Indeed, the inherent intricacy
of many of the problems tackled by Professor Moore results in so elaborate a
treatment as to make this reviewer feel the need for a condensed version, espe-
cially for the busy trial lawyer and judge; use of Moore during the pressure
of trial in search of the "quick answer" can be as nerve-racking as similar use
of Wigmore. Perhaps the forthcoming revision of Moore's Federal Rules and
Official Forms will help fill this need.
The writing of this review substantially coincides with the discharge by the
United States Supreme Court of its Advisory Committee,3 first appointed in
1935. The discharge focuses in this reviewer's mind two lines of thought: the
first, earthy and hard-headed, is that such discharge will doubtless further
enhance the permanent significance of Professor Moore's treatise. The second,
nostalgic and almost melancholic, is that with the Committee's discharge, an
epoch has closed. And the end of even a glorious era has the sadness of fare-
well about it. Because they were primarily responsible for the success of the
Federal Rules, it is fitting again to pay tribute to the giants of procedural re-
form who first served on the Advisory Committee, so many of them drawn
from the teaching branch of the profession: Charles E. Clark, Armistead M.
Dobie, Edmund M. Morgan, Edson R. Sunderland, and this reviewer's own
respected and beloved teacher, Wilbur H. Cherry; and to their worthy suc-
cessors, also from teaching ranks, Professor Moore and Maynard E. Pirsig.
These founders and their colleagues built well a solid edifice. But in their
hopes and expectations for simplification of procedure, were they overly opti-
mistic ? How simple can procedural law be, and still be law ? Professor Moore's
2. Address before the Boston Bar Association, June 16, 1923, 8 MAss. L.Q. No. 5,
at 3 (1923).
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October, 1956 term.
19561
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
treatise, as intensive as it is extensive, and the already long and rapidly
lengthening procession of cases construing the Rules which it cites, demonstrate
anew that the quest for simplicity in procedural law is an endless one-until
we become willing to equate simplicity with arbitrary will.
But there is too much for the procedural reformers of tomorrow to do to
pause long in melancholic dallying with the past. Perhaps, in taking the torch
from their illustrious predecessors, tomorrow's reformers can profitably ask
these two questions: (1) Could the rule-making power more logically, sensibly
and efficiently be lodged, so far as the federal courts are concerned, in a Judicial
Conference augmented with district judges and an adequate staff, aided of
course by an Advisory Committee, rather than in the United States Supreme
Court? And would a state's Judicial Council similarly be a more suitable
repository of the rule-making power than its Supreme Court? The California
experience is significant as possibly indicating an affirmative answer.4 (2) Can
the rule makers be too ambitious? Can they stake out for themselves too large
a claim amounting to trespass on the public domain? The deficiencies of legis-
lative code-making in the field of lawyer-law have been so notorious and glar-
ing, that it is easy to understand the rule makers' urge to grab the ball of re-
form and play the game alone. But that is not the democratic way; it is not the
right way; and ultimately it will prove to be an impossible way. For some of
the problems that are garbed in the semantics of procedure are nevertheless
deep sociological, political and jurisprudential problems, in the solution of which
the public is entitled to participate. Lawyers, judges and law professors will
do well to perform carefully their part of the task of formulating lawyer-law
rules of procedure, and to provide leadership, but not monopoly, for that part
of the task that is truly in the public domain.5
DAVID W. LouisELLt
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